India and Pakistan have fought three declared wars and many undeclared wars of proxy or low intensity wars. This article is a brief analysis of the essence of these wars at the strategic and operational level.
1947-48 Kashmir War
The 1947-48 War was an improvised war fought on an ad hoc basis. It began with some tangible operational strategy and little definite strategy on the Pakistan side and a definite operational strategy on the Indian side. At the onset Mr Jinnah the Governor General of Pakistan ordered the British Acting C in C Pakistan Army to order two brigades into Kashmir, one on the Sialkot-Jammu Axis and the other on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar-Axis. This was a tangible plan based on a precise strategy of severing Indian landward and aerial lines of communication to Kashmir. The plan was rendered null and void since the Britisher refused to obey Jinnah’s order.
This was followed by a hastily scrambled series of actions with regular Pakistan Army officers leading irregulars, irregulars besieging Indian/Dogra garrisons and conducting mini-wars against Chamb, Naushera, Srinagar, Skardu, Leh etc. In April 1948 the regular Pakistan Army entered the scene. At this stage the Indians were in a strategically disadvantageous position. Leh being cut off, Poonch besieged, Skardu besieged, Naushera threatened etc. At this stage the Pakistani strategy was to contain Indian Army advance towards Muzaffarabad, capture Poonch and safeguard Pakistan’s soft underbelly opposite Gujrat. No one at this stage thought of a ceasefire, which would have been of great strategic advantage to Pakistan. The Indians conceived a fine plan to outflank Muzaffarabad and executed a brilliant brigade level march across against the 3,000 metres plus high Nastachun Pass, thus unexpectedly forcing their way with great ease to Tithwal. The Pakistani official history noted “Brigadier Harbux Singh, commander of the 163 Brigade waited at Tithwal for two days to let the rest of his brigade join him there . He lingered a little longer to prepare for his next move and perhaps also to coordinate his moves with that of the Indian offensive in the Jhelum Valley for a two pronged push towards Muzaffarabad. This delay changed the subsequent course of history in Kishanganga Valley, as it enabled the first two companies of 4/16 Punjab under Major Mohammad Akbar Khan to reach by a forced march in the vicinity of Tithwal and take up positions there”1. The Pakistanis saved their position by reinforcing it with a brigade.
On the operational level the Pakistanis did well by capturing Pandu a position of tactical importance in the Jhelum Valley by a brilliant infiltration plan conceived by Commander 101 Brigade Brigadier Akbar Khan DSO with the indomitable Major Ishaq MC as his Brigade Major. Akbar deputed Lt Col Harvey Kelly, commanding 4/10 Baluch to plan the attack in detail.2 Pandu, however, was an operational episode of great tactical significance but limited strategic value.
From April 1948 to December 1948 the Pakistani GHQ merely reacted tactically moving companies and battalions while the Indians moved strategically. In Phase One, they recaptured Rajauri the gateway to Poonch with a single tank squadron! In Phase Two, they achieved two strategic triumphs! They forced their way through Zojila Pass driving on to relieve Leh and capture Kargil Dras and they relieved Poonch which was a mini-Indian East Pakistan surrounded from all sides by Pakistani troops.
At this stage the Pakistani GHQ had conceived the Operation Venus. Venus was a thrust against the Indian line of communication leading to Poonch Valley with an infantry and a heavy tank brigade in Naushera-Beri Patan area. At this stage the Indians were involved in the relief of Poonch and Leh and strategically off balance. The official account of 1970, however, maintains that the aim of Venus was not to sever the Indian line of communication to Poonch but merely to force the Indians for ceasefire which they did and which came into effect on night 31 Dec 1948/01 January 1949. If ceasefire was the aim then the Pakistani strategy was barren since a ceasefire in July 1948 would have been far more strategically desirable! This was so since in April 1948 Zojila (captured by Gilgit Scouts under Lieut Shah Khan on 7th July 1948) the gateway to Srinagar as well as Ladakh in Pakistani hands, the frontline near Rajauri and Poonch surrounded by Pakistani troops/irregulars. It is not clear what the Pakistani GHQ advised the civilians at this stage but no records have been made public which prove that they gave any advice!
In the 1960s General Fazal-i- Muqeem asserted that the ceasefire of 1948 took place to the army’s horror since the army was close to a great victory. However, this point is refuted by the Pakistan Army’s Official account of 1970. Much later in 1976 General Sher Ali who was commanding a brigade of the Venus Force asserted that had the operation been launched Pakistani tanks would have been in Jammu within no time! This has to be taken with a pinch of salt once we compare it to the performance of armour in an offensive role in 1965 and 1971!
The Kashmir War ended with the Indians as masters of Poonch Valley, Srinagar Valley and Leh Valley but with a communication to all three valleys running precariously close to the Pakistani border! Thus strategically the Indian position despite all their strategic triumphs was not secure since their line of communications offered multiple objectives to any single Pakistani thrust. One tank brigade with a twenty mile thrust could threaten the existence of a whole Indian army corps. The Indians took no care to remedy this state of affairs despite many war games held in their Kashmir Corps to show that the Pakistanis could threaten the Indian line of communication in Poonch Valley.3
1965 War
The 1965 War was a comical affair! Civilians at the foreign ministry assessed that the Indians could be knocked out at the strategic level while soldiers at the highest military level and political level, the president being a soldier were not interested in any military adventure. The civilian hawks led by Bhutto, however, were in league with a group of generals and brigadiers within the army and finally succeeded in persuading the president
(famous for tactical timidity in Burma) into embarking on a military adventure. Musa the army chief had little strategic insight and was against any military adventure in which he may be forced to exercise his qualities of leadership! Musa had rudimentary understanding of strategy and tank warfare since he was a political choice appointed more because he was seen as politically no threat rather than for any military strategic or operational talent!
The Pakistani offensive plan i.e. a thrust against Indian line of communication at Akhnur in case of a limited war in Kashmir or/and against Indian line of communication between Indian Corps holding Ravi-Sutlej Corridor at Jandiala Guru on Amritsar-Jullundhur road in case of an all out war was brilliant in conception. This was so because if successful any of the two plans would have forced the Indians to sue for peace at best and to surrender at worst. No less an authority than the Indian Western Command C in C Harbaksh Singh thus confessed
“A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage”.
To the Pakistan Army’s misfortune a plan which was brilliant at the strategic and operational level failed simply because those who were leading the military machine at the highest level lacked the strategic insight as well as resolution! The first opportunity was thus missed in Chamb-Jaurian Sector, when even a foreigner i.e. Chinese Foreign Minister visiting Pakistani thought that Akhnur5 was the key!
The second and most serious operational failure occurred in Khem Karan.This had more to do with poor execution at the divisional and brigade level and poor initial higher organization and composition of troops at the divisional level. The first being an operational failure and the second being an organizational failure at the higher command level.
At the operational and tactical level three events stand out in the war i.e. the Grand Slam Operation in Chamb-Jaurian, blunting of Indian offensive at Chawinda at Gadgor on 8th September when one lone tank regiment gave a severe mauling to two tank regiments out of a total available Indian force of an armoured division, and a brigade level counter attack in Lahore Sector.
Grand Slam failed because of change of command! Not because Akhtar Malik was better than Yahya but because one man either Akhtar or Yahya should have conducted the whole operation! The Indians admitted that their position was saved because of the pause of 48 hours, which occurred at Tawi after the Pakistani Chief Musa ordered change of horses in the mid stream!
Now the battle of Gadgor. Technically Gadgor was 24 Infantry Brigade Group versus 1st Indian Armoured Division. In reality the contest was 25 Cavalry versus Poona and Hodsons Horse since 24 Brigade Commander told Colonel Nisar to “do something”6 the vaguest order of 1965 War! Nisar had no idea of what was in front but by a miraculous coup d oeil deployed his tank regiment 25 Cavalry in a manner which would produce an instant nervous breakdown in an instructor who taught tank tactics at the armour school! 25 Cavalry was deployed by Nisar like a thin line of steel! Like a thin net to catch a whale! The manoeuvre if it can be called one succeeded because the Indian brigade commander was paralysed by the fog of war! Thus Commander Indian 1st Armoured Brigade saw a finger as a mountain! He saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a half squadron of Indian 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and fired at Indian Artillery opposite Rangre! What Nisar deployed after the “Do Something” order was seen by the Indian brigade commander as a tank brigade! Thus he lost the will to use two uncommitted tank regiments to outflank the Pakistani position! Gadgor was a psychological defeat inflicted on K.K Singh by Nisar with Nisar not knowing what was in front of him and K.K Singh over estimating three times what was really in front of him. Thus in cognitive terms, at Gadgor was a tank regiment commander who did not know what was in front of him against a tank brigade commander who was overawed by what he assessed was in front of him and was reduced into a state of total inertia and indecision. The important factor in this decisive battle was the fact that tangibly K.K Singh had the third tank regiment as well as three uncommitted squadrons within his two committed tank regiments with which he could have easily outflanked Nisar and got to his rear! Nisar had tangibly no reserves with which he could have countered K.K’s outflanking manoeuvre.
The counter attack of Brigadier Qayyum Sher in Lahore Sector was a successful divisional battle ordered by Major General Sarfaraz MC and executed by Brigadier Qayyum Sher most resolutely! It produced a crisis on the Indian side and threw the Indians off balance! Both retired in the same rank sometimes after the war!
1971 War
The 1971 War was a strange war! The Indians won great glory but failed to strategically solve their military problems! They overran East Pakistan creating a new state of Bangladesh but merely reduced Pakistan’s defence problems and increased their own problems by creating a new state which became more hostile to India and is far more difficult to militarily to deal with than the old East Pakistan!
The Indians, and an authority no less eminent than their 1971 GOC Western Command General Candeth have admitted that had the Pakistanis started a pre-emptive war in October 1971 all their plans to attack East Pakistan would have been thrown to the winds!7 But strategic insight had not been inculcated yet in the Pakistan Army! The Pakistanis waited and allowed the Indians to attack them in December 1971.
Much has been said about a Pakistani counter offensive in December 1971 to save East Pakistan. At this stage the Indian 1 Corps was in position and the Pakistani Higher Command like K.K Singh on 8th September to gamble their last card! There was a reason for this inaction. One that the cost was too heavy and the second that armour higher commanders (the CGS Gul Hassan and GOC 1st Armoured Division) as Yahya Khan asserts had lost the will to launch an attack.
Two cases of operational brilliance and one case of a Gadgor type tactical heroic stand out in 1971. These are the cases of the Pakistani 23 Division offensive in Chamb, the Indian defence of Poonch and the Barapind-Jarpal Battle. In Chamb Pakistan’s General Eftikhar successfully fought a divisional battle in which he deliberately manoeuvred a force of two plus tank regiments inflicting a severe mauling on the Indians forcing them to abandon Chamb. Eftikhar was firmly in control at all stages. When his initial tank thrust was checked at Maandiala he did not sink into inertia or indecision like K.K Singh at Gadgor or Pakistan’s Naseer at Khem Karan! Nor did Eftikhar tell his armoured brigade commander to “Do Something”! Eftikhar did not abdicate the conduct of operational strategy to any tank regiment of tank brigade commander! He resolutely regrouped his command and launched another attack from the south emerging victorious! The second case was the Indian stand at Poonch. The Pakistanis conceived a fine plan to capture Poonch but the Indian brigade commander at Poonch was too resolute while the Pakistani divisional and brigade commanders at Poonch lost their nerve!
The third case of a Gadgor type battle occurred at Barapind! Here the Pakistani tank brigade commander gave a simple order to resort to counter penetration to his tank regiment commander who on his own converted it into an attack! Unfortunately he carried out a piece meal attack, first sending in a squadron and then two more! The Indians admit that had 13 Lancers attacked with all three squadrons8 they would have broken through despite nominal artillery support. The hero of this battle was not the Indian brigade or regiment commander but the Indian squadron who blunted the attack and the Indian troop leader Arun Khetarpal who stopped the attack by skin of his teeth losing his life in the process! In words of Indian Armoured Corps historian the Indian success was attributable to a ‘last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader’.
1984 Crisis
The 1984 Crisis was a calculated Indian response against alleged Pakistani involvement in the Sikh Insurgency in Punjab. Tangibly the Indian position was far superior to Pakistan since Pakistan Army was still equipped with the old T-59s. The situation was saved by two Individuals who polished off the Indian ‘Durga Devi’ thus leading to a swift de-escalation of the crisis.
Siachen Crisis
1984-To Date
A case of zero strategic insight on the Indian side and of personal ambition on part of two and three star Indian generals to start private wars to gain promotion. Both sides gained nothing and one Indian Division and one Pakistani brigade is committed to a mad sentry duty role since 1984!
1987 Crisis
The 1987 Crisis was a case of over enthusiasm at the military level with little outward enthusiasm at the highest political level. The Indian Chief Sundarji was living in visions of Glory and visualized that a military manoeuvre would escalate into a war which would lead to a successful Indian military thrust severing the Pakistani line of communication in Rahimyar Khan Sector thus leading to the emergence of a new state in Pakistani Sindh and the creation of a second Indian Field Marshal after Manekshaw i.e Sundarji!
Comically Sundarji’s visions of glory were not matched by strategic insight! Thus he was overawed into inaction and inertia like K.K Singh at Gadgor, once the Pakistani High Command relocated the Pakistani reserves northwards in a purely defensive move!
1987 was a watershed and marked the Indian Army at its lowest position in the eyes of the highest Indian political leadership
vis-a-vis the high position of 1971. Sundarji destroyed all that the Indian Army had gained in 25 years with one night of irresolution and inertia!1999 Crisis
The 1999 Crisis in Kargil were the result of an audacious Pakistani plan to inflict a sharp but highly subtle psychological defeat on the Indians by threatening the Indian line of communication to Leh and Siachen by placing a small Pakistani force on the heights overlooking the Dras-Kargil-Leh Road. The execution at tactical level was brilliant albeit marked by poor logistic arrangements at divisional level! The Pakistani political leadership lost the resolution to press home the move to its final conclusion. Full facts are not available about what the Pakistan Army’s highest leadership wanted at this point in time.
The Indians payed a heavy price in terms of casualties for an intelligence failure. What Pakistan gained or lost is not clear although a debate continues about who was Kargils winner. Kargil stands out as merely one stage in a long series of actions in Pakistani military history. If Kargil was a political failure then logically the army should have packed off the political leadership in June 1999! Yet it chose to blame Nawaz only later on like it blamed Liaquat for calling off Operation Venus in 1948! Have things changed or we changed!
Conclusion
Indo-Pak Military history is a continuous story of strategic failures and a mix of operational successes and failures. At the tactical level both the armies fought well.
The reasons for the strategic failures are historical. Both states are successor states of the British Colonial Indian Empire. Indians were not groomed or trained for making strategic decisions. Strategic insight is the result of a process spread over many generations. The German General Staff was not created by a sudden flight. Even the British Empire was not created by the strategic genius of one man! Militarily the failure of both armies at the higher level is more easy to understand. Both were the continuation of a colonial army designed for internal security and brigade level actions. The Indian Army in WW Two either fought as part of a larger British Army or in circumstances of immense material superiority with massive US military aid as in Burma! The political failure in Pakistan is equally simple to explain since in words of Mr Jinnah most of the Muslim politicians would not do anything without consulting the DC (Deputy Commissioner)! That may be a reason why Nawaz Sharif went to DC!
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Pakistan Air Force Aircraft Fleet
Aircraft
Inducted
Attrition
Current
Role
Ababeel
??
??
??
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Antonov An-26
1
0
1
Medium-Lift Transport
Airbus A310
1
0
1
VIP Transport
Baaz
??
??
??
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Boeing 707
3
0
3
VIP Transport
Chengdu F-7P Skybolt
155
30?
~155
Interceptor & Ground-Support
Chengdu F-7PG
48
2
46
Interceptor
Chengdu FT-5
~20
0
20+
Fighter Conversion (Advanced Jet Training)
Chengdu FT-6
~15
0
15+
Fighter Conversion (Advanced Jet Training)
Chengdu FT-7P Skybolt
15
??
~15
Training
Chengdu FT-7PG
9
0
9
Training
Chengdu J-10
36
??
??
Multi-Role
IPTN CN-235-220
4
0
4
VIP & Light-Lift Transport
Dassault Falcon 20
2
0
2
ELINT/ECM
Dassault Falcon 20
1
0
1
VIP Transport
Dassault Mirage-IIIEP
18
2
16
Interceptor & Ground-Support
Dassault Mirage ROSE-I (Mirage-IIIDP)
5
1
4
Training & Interceptor
Dassault Mirage ROSE-I (Mirage-IIIEA) (Refurbished: Ex-Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), built by Government Aircraft Factories (GAF))
32
4
28
Interceptor
Dassault Mirage ROSE-II (Mirage-VDF) (Refurbished: Ex-French Air Force)
6
0
6
Training & Strike & Ground-Support
Dassault Mirage ROSE-II (Mirage-VEF) (Refurbished: Ex-French Air Force)
19
3
16
Strike & Ground-Support
Dassault Mirage ROSE-III (Mirage-VEF) (Refurbished: Ex-French Air Force)
14
0
14
Precision Strike
Dassault Mirage-IIIDA (Refurbished: Ex-RAAF), built by GAF
7
0
7
Training
Dassault Mirage-IIIEL (Refurbished: Ex-Lebanese Air Force)
10+1DP
0
11
Interceptor & Ground-Support
Dassault Mirage-IIIRP
13
2
11
Reconnaissance
Dassault Mirage-VPA3
12
3
9
Naval Support
Dassault Mirage-VDPA2
30
0
30
Training
Dassault Mirage-VPA
28
0
28
Ground Support
Dassault Mirage-VPA2
18
3
15
Ground Support
Embraer Phenom 300
(4 on order)
0
0
VIP transport
Fokker F27-200
2
0
2
Light Transport
Harbin Y-12 (II)
1
0
1
Light Transport
Hongdu JL-8
30
0
30
Basic & Intermediate Jet Training
JF-17 Thunder
10
-
10
Multi-Role
Lockheed L-100 Hercules
1
0
1
Medium-Lift Transport
Lockheed C-130B/E Hercules
16
6?
~10 + (6 On Order)
Medium-Lift Transport
Cessna T-37 Tweet
20
??
20
Basic Jet Training
Lockheed Martin F-16A Block-15
30*
6
24*
Multi-Role
Lockheed Martin F-16B Block-15
12
2
20
Training & Multi-Role
Lockheed Martin F-16C Block-52+
12
??
??
Multi-Role
Lockheed Martin F-16D Block-52+
6
??
??
Multi-Role
MFI-17 Mushshak
80
0
80
Primary Training
Nanchang A-5C
52
4
48
Ground-Support & Tactical Strike (Currently being phased out).
Saab 2000
5(order)[1]
0
1
Airborne Early Warning
Beechcraft Super King Air
1
0
1
Light Transport
MFI 395 Super Mushshak
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Pakistan Air Force
Andrew Brookes analyses the Pakistan Air Force which, with the lifting of a Western arms embargo, is in the process of modernisation.
Formed on August 15, 1947, with only a handful of aircrafts and men, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) now compromises around 330 combat aircrafts and 45,000 uniformed personnel. Under the Chief and Vice Chief of Air Staff., PAF Air HQ has five Deputy Chiefs responsible for operations, engineering, personnel, administration and training respectively. Geographically, the PAF is divided into three regional commands – Northern (HQ at Peshawar), Central (HQ at Sargodha) and Southern (HQ at Masroor, Karachi). These serve as the equivalent of the RAF Fighter Command groups during the Battle of Britain. Within the Commands are four sector operations centres (SOCs) – North (Peshawar), West (Quetta), Centre (Sargodha) and South (Karachi) – with seven subordinate control and reporting centres. As in so many other ways, if you want to see how the British military once did business, you need to look no further than the Indian subcontinent.
The PAF has nine main operating bases that are fully functional in both peace and wartime. These are supplemented by eleven forward bases which become fully operational in time of war, nine forward attack bare bases while the 211-mile (340km) long M-2 motorway has dispersal strips in the Swedish Air Force fashion.
The PAF has some 22 combat squadrons, six squadrons flying Aerospatiale Alouette IIIs on search and rescue/liaison duties and a composite air transport wing. Pakistan Naval Aviation looks after maritime air operations with Lockheed martin P-3C Orions, Breguet Atlantics, Fokker F-27s, Westland Sea King Mk45s, Westland Lynx HAS3 and Alouette IIIs. Pakistan Army Aviation Corps flies a mixture of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in close support of ground operations. Its main firepower is provided by Bell AH-1s Cobras.
Perceived Threat & Global Challenge
From its creation, Pakistan has believed itself ‘stuck between a rock and a hard place”. Although it shares a border with China, the most populous nation on earth, what really matters in the relationship with India. In 1947 the departing British craved India into Muslim and Hindu majority states. It was a bloody business and as Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs turned on each other, around a million people died and 17 million fled to which ever state offered them the security of majority status. This legacy explains why Pakistan devotes a s crushing share of its resources to defense. The country has been on a war footing for the whole of its existence, and has been ruled by military governments for around half that time. India’s obsession with Pakistan is less intense, but the sense of siege each instills in the other palpable. It is arguable that abiding disputes with India over Jammu and Kashmir, the Siachen glacier and control of Kashmir are what keep Pakistan together, but the idea of standing ready to deter any malign Indian intent is what underpins PAF doctrine and strategy.
During three weeks last September the PAF carried out Exercise High Mark 2005. This involved all major PAF main and forward operating bases and the scenario centered on air operations against increasing Indian Air Force (IAF) activity over the hilly terrain of Kashmir. The PAF commands divided their aircraft to form ‘Blue’ (PAF) and ‘Fox’ (IAF) Forces, and the PAF simulated the use of AIM-9P/L, R-550 Magic, R-Darter, Exocet, Maverick and cluster bomb weaponry. Two operation headquarters were set up from where ‘Blue and ‘Fox’ air forces engaged in simulated fully-fledged actions in concert with ground troops and army aviation. During High Mark 2005, Pakistani aircrews flew over 8,000 sorties.
The Pakistani strategy was defensive in nature, and aimed to culminate on a favorable note to give political leaders an edge on the negotiation table. The PAF is in no position to do other than make any opponent think long and hard before attacking. The IAF outnumbers it in uniformed personnel by some 4:1, and the ratio is high when it comes to modern, latest technology aircrafts of which the Indian Sukhoi Su-30MKI Flanker and Dassault Mirage 2000H have deeper penetration capabilities. The IAF is also bless with larger reserves, a greater beyond visual range (BVR) capacity, a larger inventory of specialist weapons, and unchallenged strategic reconnaissance capability, more surface-to-surface missiles, more potent terminal defenses, up to three times as many attack helicopters, a much superior air lift capability, satellite facilities and stealth technology. That said, the Pakistan media took it for granted that of course ‘Blue’ forces will have the quality and training edge over the ‘Fox’ forces, plus the vision and the planning capacities of the PAF leadership will serve as a booster.
During the Cold War, non-aligned India was regarded as pro-USSR while Pakistan enjoyed a close relationship with the US and France. French Mirages entered service with the PAF in 1967, and subsequent orders followed in the 1970s. In general terms, Dessault Mirage IIIs are high-speed, all weather, long-range interceptors and flight-bombers while Mirage 5s are ground attack derivations. In 1990, the PAF received 43 second-hand Mirage IIIs and Vs from France. The US provided 40 Lockheed Martin F-16A/B Fighting Falcons in the 1980s and the PAF ordered another batch in 1990, but delivery was blocked by the US Congress to punish the Pakistanis for their nuclear weapon development programme.
India and Pakistan currently have around 40 nuclear warheads apiece. The two nations are going head-to-head in developing ballistic missile delivery system capable of covering each other’s territory. Until Pakistan’s Shaheen II missile with its 1.080nm (2,000km) range enters service. PAF F-16s and Mirage 5s are the long-range nuclear platforms.
As the smaller nation, Pakistan cannot afford to engage in an attack with India. Unlike India, Pakistan does not have a tri-service Strategic Forces Command. Pakistani warheads and army’s or air force delivery systems are based separately. Its minimum nuclear deterrence relies on conventional forces holding the line for as long as it takes for nuclear warheads to be deployed forward and loaded as the PAF lacks a quick reaction alert capability. A PAF F-16s and Mirage 5s are not as potent as their IAF Mikoyan MIG-27M Flogger, Mirage 2000H and Su-30MKI equivalents. Pakistani deterrence relies on qualitative upgrades and survivability. High Mark 05 culminated in testing Pakistan’s nuclear operational preparedness.
“These past 15 years have been particularly difficult as we had no access to contemporary technology and lacked the resources to launch major acquisition programmes,” admitted Ex Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat, Ex-Commander in Chief PAF, in a recent interview. “So this was a period of improvisation and struggle as the PAF sought to maintain a combat capability with adequate deterrent value.” Faced with the Western embargo, Pakistan turned to China as its principal arms supplier, from whom it had already obtained Chengdu F-7P and F-7G multirole fighters and Nanchang A-5III close air support ground attack aircraft. The F-7 is the Mig-21 Fishbed built under Chinese licensed manufacture, and the PAF acquired 55 of the latest F-7PG medium technology variants from 2002 to keep its aircrew current pending the introduction of more capable platforms and weapon systems.
During the period of sanctions, Pakistan felt sidelined as its Indian neighbor received more advanced combat aircrafts, plus new capabilities such as airborne early warning and control aircraft, air-to-air refueling, balloon-borne surveillance radars, real-time reconnaissance through unmanned air vehicles, beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air weapons, and frequency-hopping and secure radio communications. Consequently, the PAF relied on self-help and collaboration. Pakistani technicians modified the South African T-Darter medium-range, active radar-guided air-to-air missiles (AAM) into the H-4 BVR missile capable operating out to a reported distance of 65nm (120km). A lighter infra-red version, the H-2 was designed to hit targets out to 32nm (60km). H-2 and H-4 can be carried by Mirages, with the former comparable to the Python 4 and the H-4 to the AA-12 Adder in the IAF arsenal.
Pakistan has also developed a cruise missile system – unsubtly named ‘Babur’ after Mogul emperor who invaded India five times – with rumored design help from Chinese or Ukrainian engineers as well as some help from Turkey. This high-speed, lo level terrain hugging missile is said to have a 270nm (500km) range and either a conventional or nuclear warhead. Babur initially is capable of being launched by land and submarine launch, but the longer term goal is to make it an air-to-surface weapon.Pakistan Air Force
The state-owned Pakistan Aeronautical Complex is rightly proud of its Karakoram-8 (K-8) co-produced with China, and Super Mushak developed from the Swedish Saab MF1-17. The K-8 tandem-seat basic jet trainer has been sold to eight Middle East countries while the 260hp (194kW) single piston-engined Super Mushak light primary trainer has been sold to Saudi Arabia and Oman. The PAF has recently signed a contract for 27 K-8s to add to the 12 it already possesses. In future, the PAF flying training system will compromise the MF1-17 Mushshak in primary, the K-8 in basic and the dual-seat version of the JF-17 in the lead-in-fighter-training role.
In 1999, China and Pakistan agreed on a 50-50 joint development of the FC-1/Super 7, later to be known as the JF-17 Thunder. Designed to match the Indian Light Combat Aircraft, the JF-17 is expected to be in full production by the end of the decade. The PAF is understood to be interested in purchasing 150+ of these fourth generation, multi-role agile light fighters to replace all its F-7s, Mirages and A-5IIIs by 2020. Five JF-17s prototypes now exist and this fully fly-by-wire aircraft has a maximum speed of Mach 1.8. Although of shorter range than the F-16, the JF-17 will have an all-weather navigation and attack capability, will carry a full range of ordnance and be able to engage at all speeds and altitudes. The fairing on its fin tip may be an electronic countermeasures housing. Although the JF-17 may be initially armed with less capable Chinese weaponry, such as the semi-active radar guided PL-11 AAM. “As part of the JF-17 programme we will be able to train engineers and pilots in the field of aircraft design, development, manufacturing and flight testing. This will contribute towards indigenization, self-reliance in meeting the country’s defense requirement and enhancement of economic prosperity of Pakistan, which is totally in line with the government’s policy and our national aspiration,” said Air Chief Marshal Saadat.
The Way Forward
It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good, and ‘9/11’ certainly marked a turn for the better for Pakistan. When Karachi decided to support Washington in the global war on terror, the Bush administration, together with other Western governments, erased sanctions on sophisticated weaponry. American officials were also haunted by the possibility that a nuclear-armed Pakistan could, if isolated from western support, become a breeding ground for international terrorism and a fomenter of regional instability. In the words of Air Chief Marshal Saadat: “The country obtained economic assistance, debt rescheduling and favorable trade conditions. This saw the Pakistan Government embark on a planned development of its armed forces and the PAF was granted a major allocation of resources.”
This is not before time. On August 25, 2005, a PAF Mirage crashed near the town of Badin, 105 miles (169km) east of Karachi. The pilot was able to eject safely and an air force spokesman gave ‘technical reasons’ as being responsible for the accident. Asked about frequent PAF crashes, the Commander-in-Chief PAF admitted that the attrition rate “was a bit high” and they had lost some aircraft at low level. He said the ageing Mirages were over 30 years old and the PAF was facing problems in acquiring spares because Dessault had stopped production of some components. However, Pakistan could not ground these aircraft because they formed part of the nuclear deterrent.
This explains why the PAF bough 50 Mirages, 150 sealed pack engines and a huge quantity of Mirage spares from Libya for cash in 2004. Like Pakistan, Libya owned Mirage IIIs and Vs but, although these were in excellent condition, the Libyan Air Force had been dormant for sometime following sanctions imposed after the Boeing 747 was blown up over Lockerbie. With the ex-Libyan airframes, Pakistan now operates more Mirages than the French Air Force. Most of the Libyan aircraft, however, are being cannibalized for spare parts to sustain the PAF fleet of Mirages for the next seven to ten years. Given that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) likened its Mirages with their rudimentary avionics to ‘Sopwith Camels with reheat’.
Pakistan also plans a phased upgrade and refurbishment of its oldest Mirages with new radars and avionics. Indeed work is underway for the avionics upgrade by French company SAGEM on what is believed to be a total of 14 Mirage 5EFs.
In September 2004, the US agreed to the sale of seven RAAF Lockheed Martin C-130E Hercules, including one for spares: the first of these aircraft arrived with relief goods for Kashmir earthquake survivors in November 2005. The PAF has also signed a contract with Indonesia for four CASA CN-235 transport aircraft. In the new era of international co-operation. Pakistani F-16s deployed to Konya Air Base in Turkey for air combat training in October 2004. The USAF has given Lockheed Martin an $89 million contract to supply six long-range AN/TPS-77 transportable radar systems for Pakistan under the Foreign Military Sales programme. This L-band, tactical radar provides continuous 3D surveillance of air targets out to 243nm (450km) and at altitudes up to 100,000ft (20,480m). Pakistani naval aviation is being strengthened by the gift of eight Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft to replace existing Atlantics, by the acquisition of Harpoon Block-11 missiles for carriage on the P-3C, and by making its two grounded P-3Cs maritime patrol aircraft operational by the end of this year. All will greatly enhance Pakistani maritime battle management. Pakistan is purchasing six HAI Z-9C helicopters from China and the PAF plans a mix of Chinese and Western equipment in case sanctions are ever imposed again. However, what really matters to Islamabad is access to latest network-enabled warfare technology, and that means support from the West. Air borne early warning (AEW) is vital to Pakistan’s defensive posture and the Swedish Erieye system its active phased array AEW radar (which would be mounted on SAAB 2000s) is close to winning a $1 billion ($560 million) contract to counter Indian interest in the Isreali Phalcon system for use on Ilyushin Il-76s. The Ericcson Erieye is tried and test over the cold mountainous regions that the PAF patrols, but release of some of the avionics to Pakistan depend on US export licenses.
The ‘jewel in the crown’ was the Bush administration’s announcement in March 2005 that it would sell F-16 to Pakistan again. This was seen as a reward for President Musharraf’s efforts in the war on terror, and came in response to Islamabad’s pleading for over two years. The PAF would like to equip three to five squadrons and initial indications were that Pakistan had plans to buy 79 F-16s from Lockheed Martin. Fifty-five of them would be new C/Ds and the rest second-hand, the deal including the upgrade of the 32 1980s vintage F-16s in PAF service. Two F-16s were flown to Pakistan at the end of November 2005, but the deal is now on hold as it would seem insensitive to expend US aid on fast jets while thousands are still suffering in the wake of the devastating Kashmir earthquake. President Musharraf stated that the order for the latest F-16C/Ds will enhance Pakistan ‘strategic capability’ and make a major difference to its ‘strategy of defensive deterrence.” For all the talk of the aircraft being equipped with the latest AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles to defend Pakistani airspace, the new F-16s are Justas much about enhancing the effectiveness of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.
Overall Assessment
The PAF has never had things easy. For nearly 60 years it has had to safeguard national airspace and deter as much more powerful India, a task made all the more arduous by the recent embargo on acquiring the latest technology. The PAF coped by co-operating with China, and by exploiting the undoubted expertise and professionalism of its technicians to upgrade its facilities and weaponry indigenously.
Close assistance in the global war on terror has allowed the PAF to become adept to anti-insurgent operations around the Afghan border and it has learned to deliver air-weapons with decisive effect. More modern airframes are entering service but the PAF required surveillance UAVs and precision-guided munitions to attack militant hide-outs while avoiding collateral damage. Efforts to upgrade the Pakistan ground-based air-defenses need further foreign investment to bring the PAF into the network-centric age and enable it to respond to ume-sensitive targets.
Simultaneous acquisition of complex system requires significant financial and human resources. In addition, the assimilation and efficient utilization of high technology will pose a huge challenge. That said, the PAF has a lot going for it. Foreign military observers attending High mark 2005 were impressed with the professionalism of both PAF air crews and ground personnel. Ability is rewarded and at least two females are going through flying training. However, the PAF hierarchy knows that a huge efforts will be required to upgrade training systems and syllable to prepare their personnel for the future.
The Indian Air Force has its weakness. It lacks the infrastructure to support all its air efforts, especially in the southern sector. There are gaps in its low level radar coverage, its spread of Russian and Western aircraft makes for a logistic nightmare and the unreliability of many of its MiGs has led to an appalling rate of flying accidents. That said, the arrival of BAE Systems Hawk trainers will revolutionize the IAF flying training system and Washington has balance its military sales to Pakistan by allowing Lockheed Martin and Boeing to offer the F-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet as candidates for the IAF’s multi-role programme. The Bush administration has also stated that it will support Indian requests for other ‘transformative system in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defense’. This means that even when new F-16s arrive in PAF service there may still be the same relative capability gap with India.Pakistan Air Force
In summary, the PAF may not have enough state-of-the-art equipment but for its budget and the size of its organization, it is an operationally ready and professional air force. It is on the verge of a major acquisition programme, but funding will be an abiding concern, compounded by high oil prices and the costs of the Kashmir earthquake. However, whatever the obstacles, the PAF will retain is deterrent value by virtue of the professionalism and motivation of its personnel. Whatever the challenge, the PAF will remain Pakistan’s scimitar and shield.
Andrew Brookes analyses the Pakistan Air Force which, with the lifting of a Western arms embargo, is in the process of modernisation.
Formed on August 15, 1947, with only a handful of aircrafts and men, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) now compromises around 330 combat aircrafts and 45,000 uniformed personnel. Under the Chief and Vice Chief of Air Staff., PAF Air HQ has five Deputy Chiefs responsible for operations, engineering, personnel, administration and training respectively. Geographically, the PAF is divided into three regional commands – Northern (HQ at Peshawar), Central (HQ at Sargodha) and Southern (HQ at Masroor, Karachi). These serve as the equivalent of the RAF Fighter Command groups during the Battle of Britain. Within the Commands are four sector operations centres (SOCs) – North (Peshawar), West (Quetta), Centre (Sargodha) and South (Karachi) – with seven subordinate control and reporting centres. As in so many other ways, if you want to see how the British military once did business, you need to look no further than the Indian subcontinent.
The PAF has nine main operating bases that are fully functional in both peace and wartime. These are supplemented by eleven forward bases which become fully operational in time of war, nine forward attack bare bases while the 211-mile (340km) long M-2 motorway has dispersal strips in the Swedish Air Force fashion.
The PAF has some 22 combat squadrons, six squadrons flying Aerospatiale Alouette IIIs on search and rescue/liaison duties and a composite air transport wing. Pakistan Naval Aviation looks after maritime air operations with Lockheed martin P-3C Orions, Breguet Atlantics, Fokker F-27s, Westland Sea King Mk45s, Westland Lynx HAS3 and Alouette IIIs. Pakistan Army Aviation Corps flies a mixture of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in close support of ground operations. Its main firepower is provided by Bell AH-1s Cobras.
Perceived Threat & Global Challenge
From its creation, Pakistan has believed itself ‘stuck between a rock and a hard place”. Although it shares a border with China, the most populous nation on earth, what really matters in the relationship with India. In 1947 the departing British craved India into Muslim and Hindu majority states. It was a bloody business and as Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs turned on each other, around a million people died and 17 million fled to which ever state offered them the security of majority status. This legacy explains why Pakistan devotes a s crushing share of its resources to defense. The country has been on a war footing for the whole of its existence, and has been ruled by military governments for around half that time. India’s obsession with Pakistan is less intense, but the sense of siege each instills in the other palpable. It is arguable that abiding disputes with India over Jammu and Kashmir, the Siachen glacier and control of Kashmir are what keep Pakistan together, but the idea of standing ready to deter any malign Indian intent is what underpins PAF doctrine and strategy.
During three weeks last September the PAF carried out Exercise High Mark 2005. This involved all major PAF main and forward operating bases and the scenario centered on air operations against increasing Indian Air Force (IAF) activity over the hilly terrain of Kashmir. The PAF commands divided their aircraft to form ‘Blue’ (PAF) and ‘Fox’ (IAF) Forces, and the PAF simulated the use of AIM-9P/L, R-550 Magic, R-Darter, Exocet, Maverick and cluster bomb weaponry. Two operation headquarters were set up from where ‘Blue and ‘Fox’ air forces engaged in simulated fully-fledged actions in concert with ground troops and army aviation. During High Mark 2005, Pakistani aircrews flew over 8,000 sorties.
The Pakistani strategy was defensive in nature, and aimed to culminate on a favorable note to give political leaders an edge on the negotiation table. The PAF is in no position to do other than make any opponent think long and hard before attacking. The IAF outnumbers it in uniformed personnel by some 4:1, and the ratio is high when it comes to modern, latest technology aircrafts of which the Indian Sukhoi Su-30MKI Flanker and Dassault Mirage 2000H have deeper penetration capabilities. The IAF is also bless with larger reserves, a greater beyond visual range (BVR) capacity, a larger inventory of specialist weapons, and unchallenged strategic reconnaissance capability, more surface-to-surface missiles, more potent terminal defenses, up to three times as many attack helicopters, a much superior air lift capability, satellite facilities and stealth technology. That said, the Pakistan media took it for granted that of course ‘Blue’ forces will have the quality and training edge over the ‘Fox’ forces, plus the vision and the planning capacities of the PAF leadership will serve as a booster.
During the Cold War, non-aligned India was regarded as pro-USSR while Pakistan enjoyed a close relationship with the US and France. French Mirages entered service with the PAF in 1967, and subsequent orders followed in the 1970s. In general terms, Dessault Mirage IIIs are high-speed, all weather, long-range interceptors and flight-bombers while Mirage 5s are ground attack derivations. In 1990, the PAF received 43 second-hand Mirage IIIs and Vs from France. The US provided 40 Lockheed Martin F-16A/B Fighting Falcons in the 1980s and the PAF ordered another batch in 1990, but delivery was blocked by the US Congress to punish the Pakistanis for their nuclear weapon development programme.
India and Pakistan currently have around 40 nuclear warheads apiece. The two nations are going head-to-head in developing ballistic missile delivery system capable of covering each other’s territory. Until Pakistan’s Shaheen II missile with its 1.080nm (2,000km) range enters service. PAF F-16s and Mirage 5s are the long-range nuclear platforms.
As the smaller nation, Pakistan cannot afford to engage in an attack with India. Unlike India, Pakistan does not have a tri-service Strategic Forces Command. Pakistani warheads and army’s or air force delivery systems are based separately. Its minimum nuclear deterrence relies on conventional forces holding the line for as long as it takes for nuclear warheads to be deployed forward and loaded as the PAF lacks a quick reaction alert capability. A PAF F-16s and Mirage 5s are not as potent as their IAF Mikoyan MIG-27M Flogger, Mirage 2000H and Su-30MKI equivalents. Pakistani deterrence relies on qualitative upgrades and survivability. High Mark 05 culminated in testing Pakistan’s nuclear operational preparedness.
“These past 15 years have been particularly difficult as we had no access to contemporary technology and lacked the resources to launch major acquisition programmes,” admitted Ex Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat, Ex-Commander in Chief PAF, in a recent interview. “So this was a period of improvisation and struggle as the PAF sought to maintain a combat capability with adequate deterrent value.” Faced with the Western embargo, Pakistan turned to China as its principal arms supplier, from whom it had already obtained Chengdu F-7P and F-7G multirole fighters and Nanchang A-5III close air support ground attack aircraft. The F-7 is the Mig-21 Fishbed built under Chinese licensed manufacture, and the PAF acquired 55 of the latest F-7PG medium technology variants from 2002 to keep its aircrew current pending the introduction of more capable platforms and weapon systems.
During the period of sanctions, Pakistan felt sidelined as its Indian neighbor received more advanced combat aircrafts, plus new capabilities such as airborne early warning and control aircraft, air-to-air refueling, balloon-borne surveillance radars, real-time reconnaissance through unmanned air vehicles, beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air weapons, and frequency-hopping and secure radio communications. Consequently, the PAF relied on self-help and collaboration. Pakistani technicians modified the South African T-Darter medium-range, active radar-guided air-to-air missiles (AAM) into the H-4 BVR missile capable operating out to a reported distance of 65nm (120km). A lighter infra-red version, the H-2 was designed to hit targets out to 32nm (60km). H-2 and H-4 can be carried by Mirages, with the former comparable to the Python 4 and the H-4 to the AA-12 Adder in the IAF arsenal.
Pakistan has also developed a cruise missile system – unsubtly named ‘Babur’ after Mogul emperor who invaded India five times – with rumored design help from Chinese or Ukrainian engineers as well as some help from Turkey. This high-speed, lo level terrain hugging missile is said to have a 270nm (500km) range and either a conventional or nuclear warhead. Babur initially is capable of being launched by land and submarine launch, but the longer term goal is to make it an air-to-surface weapon.Pakistan Air Force
The state-owned Pakistan Aeronautical Complex is rightly proud of its Karakoram-8 (K-8) co-produced with China, and Super Mushak developed from the Swedish Saab MF1-17. The K-8 tandem-seat basic jet trainer has been sold to eight Middle East countries while the 260hp (194kW) single piston-engined Super Mushak light primary trainer has been sold to Saudi Arabia and Oman. The PAF has recently signed a contract for 27 K-8s to add to the 12 it already possesses. In future, the PAF flying training system will compromise the MF1-17 Mushshak in primary, the K-8 in basic and the dual-seat version of the JF-17 in the lead-in-fighter-training role.
In 1999, China and Pakistan agreed on a 50-50 joint development of the FC-1/Super 7, later to be known as the JF-17 Thunder. Designed to match the Indian Light Combat Aircraft, the JF-17 is expected to be in full production by the end of the decade. The PAF is understood to be interested in purchasing 150+ of these fourth generation, multi-role agile light fighters to replace all its F-7s, Mirages and A-5IIIs by 2020. Five JF-17s prototypes now exist and this fully fly-by-wire aircraft has a maximum speed of Mach 1.8. Although of shorter range than the F-16, the JF-17 will have an all-weather navigation and attack capability, will carry a full range of ordnance and be able to engage at all speeds and altitudes. The fairing on its fin tip may be an electronic countermeasures housing. Although the JF-17 may be initially armed with less capable Chinese weaponry, such as the semi-active radar guided PL-11 AAM. “As part of the JF-17 programme we will be able to train engineers and pilots in the field of aircraft design, development, manufacturing and flight testing. This will contribute towards indigenization, self-reliance in meeting the country’s defense requirement and enhancement of economic prosperity of Pakistan, which is totally in line with the government’s policy and our national aspiration,” said Air Chief Marshal Saadat.
The Way Forward
It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good, and ‘9/11’ certainly marked a turn for the better for Pakistan. When Karachi decided to support Washington in the global war on terror, the Bush administration, together with other Western governments, erased sanctions on sophisticated weaponry. American officials were also haunted by the possibility that a nuclear-armed Pakistan could, if isolated from western support, become a breeding ground for international terrorism and a fomenter of regional instability. In the words of Air Chief Marshal Saadat: “The country obtained economic assistance, debt rescheduling and favorable trade conditions. This saw the Pakistan Government embark on a planned development of its armed forces and the PAF was granted a major allocation of resources.”
This is not before time. On August 25, 2005, a PAF Mirage crashed near the town of Badin, 105 miles (169km) east of Karachi. The pilot was able to eject safely and an air force spokesman gave ‘technical reasons’ as being responsible for the accident. Asked about frequent PAF crashes, the Commander-in-Chief PAF admitted that the attrition rate “was a bit high” and they had lost some aircraft at low level. He said the ageing Mirages were over 30 years old and the PAF was facing problems in acquiring spares because Dessault had stopped production of some components. However, Pakistan could not ground these aircraft because they formed part of the nuclear deterrent.
This explains why the PAF bough 50 Mirages, 150 sealed pack engines and a huge quantity of Mirage spares from Libya for cash in 2004. Like Pakistan, Libya owned Mirage IIIs and Vs but, although these were in excellent condition, the Libyan Air Force had been dormant for sometime following sanctions imposed after the Boeing 747 was blown up over Lockerbie. With the ex-Libyan airframes, Pakistan now operates more Mirages than the French Air Force. Most of the Libyan aircraft, however, are being cannibalized for spare parts to sustain the PAF fleet of Mirages for the next seven to ten years. Given that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) likened its Mirages with their rudimentary avionics to ‘Sopwith Camels with reheat’.
Pakistan also plans a phased upgrade and refurbishment of its oldest Mirages with new radars and avionics. Indeed work is underway for the avionics upgrade by French company SAGEM on what is believed to be a total of 14 Mirage 5EFs.
In September 2004, the US agreed to the sale of seven RAAF Lockheed Martin C-130E Hercules, including one for spares: the first of these aircraft arrived with relief goods for Kashmir earthquake survivors in November 2005. The PAF has also signed a contract with Indonesia for four CASA CN-235 transport aircraft. In the new era of international co-operation. Pakistani F-16s deployed to Konya Air Base in Turkey for air combat training in October 2004. The USAF has given Lockheed Martin an $89 million contract to supply six long-range AN/TPS-77 transportable radar systems for Pakistan under the Foreign Military Sales programme. This L-band, tactical radar provides continuous 3D surveillance of air targets out to 243nm (450km) and at altitudes up to 100,000ft (20,480m). Pakistani naval aviation is being strengthened by the gift of eight Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft to replace existing Atlantics, by the acquisition of Harpoon Block-11 missiles for carriage on the P-3C, and by making its two grounded P-3Cs maritime patrol aircraft operational by the end of this year. All will greatly enhance Pakistani maritime battle management. Pakistan is purchasing six HAI Z-9C helicopters from China and the PAF plans a mix of Chinese and Western equipment in case sanctions are ever imposed again. However, what really matters to Islamabad is access to latest network-enabled warfare technology, and that means support from the West. Air borne early warning (AEW) is vital to Pakistan’s defensive posture and the Swedish Erieye system its active phased array AEW radar (which would be mounted on SAAB 2000s) is close to winning a $1 billion ($560 million) contract to counter Indian interest in the Isreali Phalcon system for use on Ilyushin Il-76s. The Ericcson Erieye is tried and test over the cold mountainous regions that the PAF patrols, but release of some of the avionics to Pakistan depend on US export licenses.
The ‘jewel in the crown’ was the Bush administration’s announcement in March 2005 that it would sell F-16 to Pakistan again. This was seen as a reward for President Musharraf’s efforts in the war on terror, and came in response to Islamabad’s pleading for over two years. The PAF would like to equip three to five squadrons and initial indications were that Pakistan had plans to buy 79 F-16s from Lockheed Martin. Fifty-five of them would be new C/Ds and the rest second-hand, the deal including the upgrade of the 32 1980s vintage F-16s in PAF service. Two F-16s were flown to Pakistan at the end of November 2005, but the deal is now on hold as it would seem insensitive to expend US aid on fast jets while thousands are still suffering in the wake of the devastating Kashmir earthquake. President Musharraf stated that the order for the latest F-16C/Ds will enhance Pakistan ‘strategic capability’ and make a major difference to its ‘strategy of defensive deterrence.” For all the talk of the aircraft being equipped with the latest AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles to defend Pakistani airspace, the new F-16s are Justas much about enhancing the effectiveness of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.
Overall Assessment
The PAF has never had things easy. For nearly 60 years it has had to safeguard national airspace and deter as much more powerful India, a task made all the more arduous by the recent embargo on acquiring the latest technology. The PAF coped by co-operating with China, and by exploiting the undoubted expertise and professionalism of its technicians to upgrade its facilities and weaponry indigenously.
Close assistance in the global war on terror has allowed the PAF to become adept to anti-insurgent operations around the Afghan border and it has learned to deliver air-weapons with decisive effect. More modern airframes are entering service but the PAF required surveillance UAVs and precision-guided munitions to attack militant hide-outs while avoiding collateral damage. Efforts to upgrade the Pakistan ground-based air-defenses need further foreign investment to bring the PAF into the network-centric age and enable it to respond to ume-sensitive targets.
Simultaneous acquisition of complex system requires significant financial and human resources. In addition, the assimilation and efficient utilization of high technology will pose a huge challenge. That said, the PAF has a lot going for it. Foreign military observers attending High mark 2005 were impressed with the professionalism of both PAF air crews and ground personnel. Ability is rewarded and at least two females are going through flying training. However, the PAF hierarchy knows that a huge efforts will be required to upgrade training systems and syllable to prepare their personnel for the future.
The Indian Air Force has its weakness. It lacks the infrastructure to support all its air efforts, especially in the southern sector. There are gaps in its low level radar coverage, its spread of Russian and Western aircraft makes for a logistic nightmare and the unreliability of many of its MiGs has led to an appalling rate of flying accidents. That said, the arrival of BAE Systems Hawk trainers will revolutionize the IAF flying training system and Washington has balance its military sales to Pakistan by allowing Lockheed Martin and Boeing to offer the F-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet as candidates for the IAF’s multi-role programme. The Bush administration has also stated that it will support Indian requests for other ‘transformative system in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defense’. This means that even when new F-16s arrive in PAF service there may still be the same relative capability gap with India.Pakistan Air Force
In summary, the PAF may not have enough state-of-the-art equipment but for its budget and the size of its organization, it is an operationally ready and professional air force. It is on the verge of a major acquisition programme, but funding will be an abiding concern, compounded by high oil prices and the costs of the Kashmir earthquake. However, whatever the obstacles, the PAF will retain is deterrent value by virtue of the professionalism and motivation of its personnel. Whatever the challenge, the PAF will remain Pakistan’s scimitar and shield.
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